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THE DARKER SIDE OF NONPROFITS: WHEN CHARITIES
AND SOCIAL WELFARE GROUPS BECOME
POLITICAL SLUSH FUNDS
ROBERT PAUL MEIERT
INTRODUCTION: CLINTON'S BILTMORE BONANZA
The 1996 general election was only two weeks away.1 Many of Flor-
ida's Democratic faithful had gathered at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Ga-
bles for a prominent fundraiser.2 This was their mission: to provide Demo-
cratic candidate President Bill Clinton with a final surge of cash to send him
coasting to a second term in the White House. The price of admission that
night was $1,500. 3 And at least one person, Warren Meddoff, intended to
help contribute much, much more.
After briefly speaking at the fundraiser, Clinton was making his way
through the "crush" of attendees when Meddoff handed him a business
t B.A. 1994, Washington State University; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Pennsyl-
vania. This Comment is a criticism of people bending the rules, so I will not ask the Law Re-
view editors for more space to express my appreciation to those who helped me with this pa-
per--even though one footnote is not enough. The following, however, deserve my special
thanks: my parents, Bob and Barb Meier, the hard-working members of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review; and the "12th Floor Torti." Lastly, to the politicians who are en-
trusted with leading our democracy, I offer this cautionary note from former President Ronald
Reagan: "Politics is supposed to be the second oldest profession. I have come to realize that
it bears a very close resemblance to the first." THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF HUMOROUs
QUOTATIONs 256 (Ned Sherrin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
1 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with the 1996 Federal
Election Campaign-Part I: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
105th Cong. 251 (1997) [hereinafter Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part V11]
(testimony of R. Warren Meddoff, former Director of Governmental Affairs, Bukkehave, Inc.)
(testifying that the fundraising dinner occurred on October 22, 1996). The 1996 general elec-
tion took place on November 5.
2 See id.
3 See id. Meddoff's ticket was paid for by his employer, the American subsidiary of
Bukkehave, Inc., a Danish firm that "supplies vehicles and spare parts. .. [to] the third
world.' Id. at 250-51.
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card.4 Clinton "took two [more] steps" and stopped in his tracks.5 Glancing
at the card, he had read a simple message handwritten by Meddoff: "'I have
an associate that [sic] is interested in donating $5 million to your cam-
paign.' ' 6 The amount offered was equivalent to 3,300 additional guests
rushing into the fundraiser. President Clinton immediately found Meddoff,
a stranger until this point, and informed him that a staff member would be in
contact.
7
Four days later, with just ten days left until the general election, White
House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes called Meddoff from Air Force
One to discuss the proposed contribution.8 By now, the offer became even
more incredible and completely unprecedented in American politics.9 Med-
doff informed Ickes that a business associate, 10 Bill Morgan, was expecting
a "very large sum of money" from a business deal and was willing to donate
$5 million initially and another $50 million over the course of the next ten
months." The catch was that Meddoff's associate wanted the contributions
to President Clinton to be tax deductible. Ickes reportedly replied that
there were "tax-favorable" ways of assisting Clinton's reelection cam-
paign.
13
Later in the week, Ickes called again from Air Force One and informed
Meddoff that the Clinton campaign had an "'immediate need for $1.5 mil-
lion within the next 24 hours." '14 Meddoff was unsure if Morgan could ob-
4 Id. at 252.
5Id.
6 Id. at 251.
7 See id. at 252 ("mhe President asked if... he could have another one of [the business]
cards for his staff, and [said] that somebody would get in touch with me in a few days.").
8 See id. (testifying that Ickes contacted Meddoff on October 26, 1996 while calling from
Air Force One).
9 See id. at 274 (statement of Sen. Don Nickles) (stating that Meddoff was offering "un-
heard-of contributions" to Clinton's reelection campaign, and that "no one individual" has
ever made such large donations to a political campaign).
10 For seven years, Meddoff and Morgan were partners in a speculative-and unsuccess-
ful-attempt to sell "pre-1940, gold-backed German loan documents," which Germany re-
fuses to honor, to nations now owing money to Germany and seeking to offset their debts to
that country. Id. at 250-51, 261, 286 (testimony of R. Warren Meddoff, former Director of
Governmental Affairs, Bukkehave, Inc.). However, despite sharing in multi-billion dollar
sales contracts (if a deal was ever successful) and speaking on the phone with each other up to
"five to ten times a day" for years, the two had never met in person. Id. at 258.
11Id. at 252-53.
12 See id. at 253 ("Mr. Morgan felt that he would have a very large tax liability from [the
income from which the donations would be made], and he wanted to see if any special consid-
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tain the funds that quickly.15 Still, Meddoff requested that Ickes forward a
list of where the money should be sent.16  Within hours, Ickes, from the
President's plane, dictated to a White House staff member a list of four or-
ganizations to receive the $1.5 million.17 The Ickes list was then faxed to
Meddoff from the White House.
18
The list that Meddoff received was a hodgepodge of organizations, 19
some offering the tax haven that Morgan sought, and others not. Contribu-
tions to the two nonprofit charities on the Ickes list, Vote Now '96 and the
National Coalition of Black Voter Participation ("Black Voter Coalition"),
would be tax deductible.20 By law, these groups must operate exclusively
for religious, educational, or similar purposes.21  Such charities are also
limited in the political activities they may undertake, and are barred from
engaging in political campaigning. 22 Contributions to the other two organi-
zations, the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") and the Defeat 209
15 See id.
Mr. Ickes called me, and even though [I] had made it clear [that Morgan and I] were
not expecting funds for quite a few days, he said, "[Clinton's campaign has] an im-
mediate need for $1.5 million within the next 24 hours." ... [A]nd I said, "I don't
believe [the money will be available in] 24 hours. Perhaps within 48. ..
Id.
16 See id. ("[A]nd I said, 'We don't even know where you need us to send the money or
what it's for,' and [Ickes] sa[id], 'I'll get back to you .... '").
17 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with the 1996 Federal
Election Campaign-Part IX Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
105th Cong. 95 (1997) [hereinafter Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part 1X]
(statement of Harold M. Ickes, former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President) ("I was on Air
Force One when I talked to Mr. Meddoff. The memorandum ... was dictated by me... to
somebody at the White House.").
18 See id. ("[The Ickes list] was typed [at the White House], and it was sent from the
White House to Mr. Meddoff.").
19 The Ickes fax directed Meddoff to make contributions to the following groups: Vote
Now '96, the National Coalition of Black Voter Participation, the Democratic National Com-
mittee, and the Defeat 209 campaign. See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part
VII, supra note 1, at 645-47 (reporting a facsimile from Harold M. Ickes, former White House
Deputy Chief of Staff to R. Warren Meddoff, former Director of Governmental Affairs, Buk-
kehave, Inc. that listed the name, tax status, bank account information and contact informa-
tion, and requested donation amount for each group selected by Ickes to receive a contribu-
tion).
Both organizations are I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charities. See id. at 294 (statement of Sen.
Joseph I. Lieberman). Contributions to such groups are usually tax deductible. See infra note
77 (noting that contributions to qualified charities are deductible under I.R.C. § 170(c)).
21 See infra note 70 (listing the purposes for which charities may operate to qualify under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
2 See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing the limits placed on charities'
political and political campaign activities). For a discussion of the difference between "politi-
cal activity" and "political campaign activity," see infra note 76, noting that "political cam-
paign activity" is a subset of "political activity.'
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campaign,23 were not tax deductible, because both are classified under the
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") as groups that typically engage in signifi-
cant political and political campaign activity, albeit to differing degrees.
24
Meddoff claimed that later during the same day that he received the fax,
Ickes, perhaps realizing the potential impropriety of listing tax-exempt
charities as Clinton-friendly organizations, called and requested that the fax
be shredded. Ickes has refuted this allegation, stating that he "did not urge
[Meddoff] to destroy the document ... [to the] best of[his] knowledge."26
In the end, neither the $1.5 million nor the other $53.5 million was ever
used to the benefit of President Clinton's campaign.27 In fact, the money
may never have existed. The contributions were supposed to come from a
suspect business transaction involving the sale of old railroad bonds.
28
23 Defeat 209 "spearhead[ed] the opposition in California to Proposition
209,... subsequently approved by voters, [which] prohibits race- and gender-based prefer-
ences in state hiring, contracts and college admissions." Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Fundraising
Reform Ahead?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 20, 1997, at Al.
24 Political party organizations, such as the DNC, are organized under I.R.C. § 527, and
such groups usually take part in substantial political campaign activity. See infra notes 85-86
and accompanying text (describing the activities in which political organizations engage).
Defeat 209 was an I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organization. See Investigation oflllegal or Improper
Activities Part VII, supra note 1, at 294 (statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman) (noting the
tax status of Defeat 209). Groups established under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) are social welfare or-
ganizations that typically engage in extensive lobbying on issues, but may only engage in
limited political campaign activities. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (noting
that social welfare groups can lobby, but are limited in their capacity to engage in political
campaign activity). Contributions to either type of organization do not qualify for tax deduc-
tions. See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, CHARITY, ADVOCACY, AND THE LAW 250, 464 (1992).
25 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part VII, supra note 1, at 255 (testi-
mony of R. Warren Meddoff, former Director of Governmental Affairs, Bukkehave, Inc.)
("[Iekes] called me and very nicely said, 'I sent you that fax in error. I shouldn't have sent it.
Would you please shred it?').
26 Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part IX, supra note 17, at 94 (statement
of Harold M. Ickes, former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President) (emphasis added). In a
June 27, 1997 deposition, Ickes also denied instructing Meddoff to shred the facsimile, but
conceded that he "may have told Meddoff that the fax was 'inoperative.' 3 SENATE CoMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN
CONNECTION WIH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS: FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 105-
167, at 3628-29 (1998) [hereinafter FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN
ACTIVITIES].
27 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part VI, supra note 1, at 276 (testi-
mony of R. Warren Meddoff, former Director of Governmental Affairs, Bukkehave, Inc.)
(noting that Morgan did not contribute to Clinton's campaign).
28 Morgan, of Richardson, Texas, planned to make the $55 million contribution from a
supposed $300 million profit "from the sale of two old railroad bonds." Robert Nolin, Busi-
nessman Regrets Contribution Offer: Potential Clinton Donor Paid Price to Be a Political
Player, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 28, 1997, at lB. Morgan claims to have sold
the bonds since then, but has refused to disclose the sum he received for the historical docu-
ments. See id.
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Morgan, Clinton's supposed benefactor-to-be, was also thousands of dollars
in debt to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
29
This bizarre tale, revealed in the Senate hearings on alleged campaign
fundraising abuses in the 1996 elections, paints a dubious picture of the
American political landscape. Here, mysterious figures who were virtual
strangers to President Clinton gained access to him and his closest aides by
offering unprecedented contributions, provided that the donations could be
routed to tax-deductible sources. Among the many questions that this story
raises is how did charities such as Vote Now '96 and the Black Voter Coa-
lition--groups that face strict limits on the political activities in which they
are permitted to engage-make it onto the Ickes list and become the topic of
urgent phone calls made from Air Force One during the final days before
the election?
This Comment examines an alarming trend in which charities and social
welfare groups have become powerful political players, yet have been able
to circumvent IRC limits on nonprofit political activity and to avoid nearly
all election regulations. Part I analyzes the activities of two supposedly
nonpartisan, nonprofit groups, Vote Now '96 (an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charity)
and the Citizens for the Republic Education Fund ("Republic Education
Fund") (an I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social welfare organization during the 1996
30elections). Part II outlines the current regulation of such groups under the
IRC and the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), while Part III ex-
plains how both Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education Fund used gaps
in the law to engage in otherwise prohibited partisan endeavors.
29 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part VII, supra note 1, at 301
(statement of Sen. John Glenn) (noting that Morgan, in 1995 and 1996, was subject to two
IRS liens "totaling about $26,000"). In 1988, after defaulting on a personal note, Morgan ap-
peared in court claiming that "he could not afford an attorney... [and] had no financial assets
to have himselfrepresented." Id. at 279 (statement of Sen. Robert G. Torricelli).
30 See infra note 48 (noting that the Republic Education Fund was an I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
social welfare group). Following the 1996 elections, the Republic Education Fund "switched
[its tax] status from [a] 'social welfare' group-] to the same tax status designed to fit political
parties." Jeanne Cummings, "Issue Advocacy" Groups to Play Bigger Role, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 1998, at A16. The Republic Education Fund's new tax status, likely reflecting an at-
tempt by the group to "get off of the media radar screen" and "avoid trouble," "provides the
same, if not better, tax benefits and clearly allows political participation." Id. The Republic
Education Fund's use of the political party tax status .'push[es] the envelope' of tax and cam-
paign finance rules," and is based upon "two obscure IRS 'private [letter] rulings' on which
the IRS refuses to comment. Karren Gullo, IRS Rules Will Let Donors to "Civic" Groups
Stay Secret, DENVER POST, Oct. 24, 1997, at A32. Some tax experts predict that the Republic
Education Fund's move could set off a new trend among nonprofit groups seeking to evade
IRC and Federal Election Campaign Act limits on political activity. See Cummings, supra.
This possible new loophole is not examined further in this Comment.
1999]
976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Part IV of this Comment proposes to close the legal loopholes allowing
charities and social welfare groups to engage in unregulated political activi-
ties by requiring that any activity likely to influence an election be con-
ducted through nonprofit political action committees ("PACs"). This plan
will allow nonprofit organizations to engage in political activity and ensure
that such endeavors are regulated, while imposing few burdens on the ex-
isting rights of charities and social welfare groups.
I. THE POLITICAL UNDERWORLD OF NONPROFITS
A. Vote Now '96: The Democrats' Political Charity
Vote Now '96, one of the nonprofit organizations on the Ickes list, of-
fers a telling example of the extent to which the line between political cam-
paigning and charitable endeavors has blurred.3' Vote Now '96, to which
Ickes directed Meddoff to contribute $250,000,32 is touted as a "nonpartisan
voter registration or... get-out-the-vote group." 33 Upon closer inspection,
however, Vote Now '96 seems more like a taxpayer-subsidized 34 slush fund
for the Democratic Party.
31 The other charity on the Ickes list, the Black Voter Coalition, could also serve as an
example of politics and charitable causes intertwining.
mhe DNC [has] acknowledged that the party gave $117,500 to the [Black Voter
Coalition] and asked several Democratic donors to contribute directly to the group.
The coalition helped register 150,000 African American voters during the "Million
Man March" in 1995 and it worked to elect Democrats to Congress in 83 House dis-
tricts during the [1996] election cycle.
Ralph Frammolino, DNC Tied to Plan to Test Gifts Limits, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1997, at Al.
32 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part VII, supra note 1, at 647 (fac-
simile from Harold M. Ickes, former White House Deputy Chief of Staff to R. Warren Med-
doff, former Director of Governmental Affairs, Bukkehave, Inc.).
33 Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities Part IX, supra note 17, at 167 (statement
of Mark F. Thomann, former Midwest Finance Director, DNC).
34 Charities, such as Vote Now '96, are tax exempt, and contributions to such groups are
tax deductible. See infra notes 69, 77 (noting that charities are tax exempt and that contribu-
tions to such groups are tax deductible).
Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy .... A tax ex-
emption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount
of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to
cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's contributions.
Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). Because even political
parties are, for the most part, tax-exempt, see infra notes 69, 88 (noting that political parties
are tax exempt, except for taxes imposed on some limited types of income), "taxpayer subsi-
dized" and related terms in this Comment typically will refer only to the additional tax deduc-
tions given to charitable contributions.
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Vote Now '96 operated exclusively to increase voter turnout in "heavily
Democratic" areas.35 The group's "executive director was deputy finance
director of the [DNC] throughout Clinton's 1992 campaign. Its chairman
was chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee in 1993-
94."36 On July 12, 1996, President Clinton and the First Lady held a fund-
raiser for Vote Now '96 at the White House.
37
Some of the [sixty] guests were wealthy donors who wanted to give money to
the Democratic Party but preferred to do so quietly, either because they had
business before the Government or simply wanted to avoid having their names
appear on public donor lists.
The solution was simple, they were told. They could make their donations
to an organization called Vote Now '96, which was ostensibly created to en-
courage voter turnout and, unlike the [DNC] or the Clinton-Gore campaign or-
ganization, would not be required to identify the donors or the amount of their
gifts. Vote Now '96 ultimately received $3 million in donations in the 1996
.38campaign.
The Democrats probably made other attempts to steer contributors to
Vote Now '96. The charity received $3,000 from Clinton supporter and Ar-
kansas restaurateur, Yah Lin "Charlie" Trie,39 who was later implicated in a
Chinese plot to bias the outcomes of the 1996 federal election.40 A "foreign
businessman," Gilbert Chagoury, who was living in Paris and "closely tied
to Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha," contributed $460,000 to Vote Now '96.41
Despite the fact that Chagoury was "not a party contributor and[, as a for-
35 Jill Abramson & Leslie Wayne, Both Parties Were Assisted by Nonprofit Groups in
1996, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1997, at Al.
36 Burying the Treasure, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 10, 1997, at 10B.
37 See Abramson & Wayne, supra note 35 (reporting that the Clinton's hosted guests for
a White House dinner on July 12, 1996 to "help generate donations" for Vote Now '96).
38 Id.
39 See Investigation ofIllegal or Improper Activities Part VII, supra note I, at 649.
40 See 2 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIvITIES, supra note
26, at 2501-05 (noting that China's government "fashioned a plan before the 1996 elections"
to "influence our political process," and that China acted "to influence U.S. elections"); see
also id. at 2503 (noting that Trie has been "connected to" political donations made with "for-
eign money"); China Bank Reportedly Sent Money to DNC Fund-Raiser, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 2, 1997, at 8A (reporting that the government-owned Bank of China "wired large
sums of money" to Trie in 1995 and 1996 while he was raising funds for Clinton and the
Democratic Party). Trie initially "fled to Beijing rather than testify before a Senate committee
investigating campaign abuses," but subsequently returned to the United States and "surren-
dered to federal agents." Richard Sisk, Clinton Pal Turns Himself in, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb.
4, 1998, at 16.
41 Charles R. Babcock & Susan Schmidt, Voters Group Donor Got DNC Perk, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al. "Chagoury was solicited by a DNC fund-raiser... to give
to ... Vote Now [']96." Id.
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eign citizen,] could hot legally give to the Democrats," he was invited to a
special dinner on December 21, 1996 for the 250 top donors to the DNC.nz
Vote Now '96 was also scrutinized during the criminal investigation of
charges that the DNC "swapped" contributions with Ron Carey's 1996 ree-
lection campaign to head the Teamsters labor union.
At their heart, the swap schemes envisioned the Teamsters contributing not
only to the DNC, but also to various tax-exempt organizations ....
In exchange, the DNC and various tax-exempt organizations would [ille-
gally] contribute directly or indirectly to the election campaign of Teamsters
president, Ron Carey, through an entity called the Teamsters for a Corruption-
Free Union ....
When all of these circumstances are considered, Vote Now '96 begins
to look a lot less like a nonpartisan charity engaged in voter registration and
much more like an offshoot of the Democratic Party, performing the politi-
cally valuable service of getting Democrats to the polls. However, despite
the arguably partisan activities of Vote Now '96, the anonymous contribu-
tors, the foreign donors, and the limitless size of allowable contributions
(complete with a tax deduction), there is still one more incredible aspect to
this story. And that is the fact that possibly everything Vote Now '96 did is
perfectly legal.44
42 Id.; see also infra note 93 (noting that foreign nationals are prohibited by FECA from
making political contributions).
43 Investigation ofllegal or Improper Activities Part IX, supra note 17, at 163 (statement
of Sen. Fred Thompson).
The swap ... [was] relatively simple.... [The DNC would persuade a wealthy
donor to give $100,000 to Ron Carey's election campaign. In return, the Teamsters
[controlled by Carey] would contribute some multiple of that amount, perhaps a mil-
lion dollars, out of its treasury or PAC funds to the [Democratic Party] ....
... In furtherance of the conspiracy in or about July 1996, the DNC determined
that a foreign citizen who previously pledged to contribute $100,000 to the
DNC [but who was barred under FECA from making such a political donation] was
willing to make that contribution to the Teamsters for a Corruption-Free Union.
When it was determined that the foreign citizen was an employer and, hence,
under the Federal labor laws could not contribute to the Carey campaign, the foreign
money was steered by the DNC to a tax-exempt organization called Vote Now 1996.
Id. at 163-64 (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (internal quotations omitted).
44 See, e.g., 6 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN AcTIvims, supra
note 26, at 9529 (Minority Views) (Additional views of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman) ("[TIhe sad
truth is that most of the worst behavior that occurred in the 1996 elections was legal....
[T]he conversion of supposedly non-partisan, tax-exempt groups into political
agents... plainly violates the spirit of our laws. Yet [it] appears to be legal.") Aside from
Vote Now '96's implication in the DNC-Teamsters-Carey swap scheme likely offering further
evidence that the charity is closely tied to the Democratic Party, the alleged illegal plot to fun-
nel contributions to Carey via Vote Now '96 is outside the scope of this Comment and is not
discussed further.
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B. More Nonprofits Join the Fray: The Republic Education Fund
As a nonprofit group created to advance political interests, Vote Now
'96 had plenty of company in 1996.! 5 Consider, for example, the following
television advertisement:
Senate candidate Winston Bryant's budget as Attorney General increased 71
[percent]. Bryant has taken taxpayer funded junkets to the Virgin Islands,
Alaska, and Arizona. And spent about $100,000 on new furniture. Unfortu-
nately, as the state's top law enforcement official, he's never opposed the pa-
role of any convicted criminal, even rapists and murderers. And almost 4,000
Arkansas prisoners have been sent back to prison for crimes committed while
they were out on parole. Winston Bryant: government waste, political jun-
kets, soft on crime.... Call Winston Bryant and tell him to give the money
back.. 46
Most voters in Arkansas likely would assume that Bryant's Republican
opponent for the U.S. Senate, Tim Hutchinson, 47 produced this advertise-
ment. Few, however, would guess that it was produced and paid for by a
nonprofit social welfare organization,4
8 incorporated in Washington, D.C.,49
called the Citizens for the Republic Education Fund.50
The Republic Education Fund was created on June 20, 1996,51 just in
time for the 1996 elections. With neither "a staff [n]or an office," however,
the social welfare group was little more than a "shell compan[y]" for Tacti-
cal Resources in American Democracy ("TRIAD").5 2 TRIAD is a suppos-
45 See 3 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, supra note
26, at 3993 ("The 1996 election witnessed an unprecedented level of political activity by non-
profit groups.... [D]uring the 1996 election cycle, nonprofit groups spent between 55 and 70
million dollars on political advocacy campaigns.").
46 ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, ISSUE
ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN: A CATALOGUE 23 (1997) [herein-
after ANNENBERG].
47 See id. (noting that Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Winston Bryant was opposed,
and defeated, by Republican Tim Hutchinson).
48 See Gullo, supra note 30 (reporting that the Republic Education Fund was an I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare group in 1996). For a discussion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social wel-
fare organizations, see infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text.
50 See Gullo, supra note 30.
so See ANNENBERG, supra note 46, at 23.
51 See id. Actually, the Republic Education Fund "has been through as many incarna-
tions as a candidate's stump speech." Eliza Newlin Carney, Stealth Bombers, 29 NAT'L J.
1640, 1640 (1997). The organization was originally established by Ronald Reagan as a PAC
to "help bankroll his first successful presidential bid [in 1980]." Id. The Republic Education
Fund operated actively as a PAC until at least 1992, and, after "a period of near-
dormancy, ... resurfaced at the start of the 1995-96 election cycle" as a social welfare organi-
zation. Id.
52 5 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVrrIES, supra note 26, at
6290-91 (Minority Views). "On September 27, 1996, six weeks prior to the elec-
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edly for-profit5 3 consulting firm incorporated in 199654 that routes money
from "wealthy conservative donors" to Republican candidates, PACs, and
nonprofit groups.
55
TRIAD is run by Carolyn Malenick, a consultant who "spent her entire
professional career in conservative Republican politics. '56 In 1996, TRIAD
paid political consultants to meet with "as many as 250 Republican cam-
paigns" in order to "assess each candidate's viability... [and] to give stra-
tegic advice. 5 7 Information generated from these meetings was passed to
the Republic Education Fund,58 which then produced "negative attack ad-
vertising," such as the anti-Bryant advertisement, that criticized the Demo-
cratic opponents of the Republican candidates.5 9 The Republic Education
Fund received much of the money for its attack advertisements from
TRIAD,60 which in turn received large contributions from wealthy individu-
als who had already made the maximum legal donation to the Republican
candidates who benefited from the Republic Education Fund's advertise-
tion .... Triad entered into a formal consulting agreement with... [the Republic Education
Fund that] granted to Triad carte blanche authority to act on behalf of... [the] organiza-
tion[." Id. at 6302-03.
See id. at 6293 ("Triad is not a business in the conventional sense, because it charges
no fees and generates no profit.").
54 See id. at 6291 (noting that TRIAD was incorporated in 1996 and "established an of-
fice on Capitol Hill").
55 Abramson & Wayne, supra note 35.
56 5 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITES, supra note 26, at
6291 (Minority Views).
57 Id. at 6295.
58 See id. at 6304 ("Both the content of the [Republic Education Fund's] advertising and
the determination of where to air advertising was clearly influenced by [the consultants'] con-
versations with the candidates and the campaigns.").
59 Id. (stating that the candidates benefiting from such negative advertising "were the
same candidates for whom Triad had solicited contributions and advised on campaign and
fundraising strategy"). A Senate investigation concluded that the Republic Education Fund's
advertisements were not FECA-regulated "coordinated expenditures," because the Republican
candidates did not "direct] the substance or location of [the Republic Education Fund's] issue
advocacy expenditures" and had only "abstract" communication with TRIAD. 3 id. at 4008.
See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441a-(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994) (stating that an expenditure "by any person
in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candi-
date.. . shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate"); I I C.F.R. §
109.1(b)(4)(i)(A) (1998) (stating that an expenditure is a contribution to a candidate if it is
based on information given by the candidate "with a view toward having an expenditure
made").
60 See 5 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, supra note
26, at 6308 (Minority Views) (noting that the Republic Education Fund "was entirely financed
by Triad from its creation through September 1996"); see also id. at 6307 (noting that "Triad
and... [the Republic Education Fund] were largely financed by a single backer," who is
"suspected" to be Robert Cone, a businessman who supports conservative causes).
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ments.61 Even the Mafia would be impressed by this money laundering op-
eration.
In 1996, the Republic Education Fund-which was granted its "tax-
exempt status... after it told the [IRS that] it would not spend money to in-
fluence elections" 62-flooded "$4 million in[to] more than a dozen congres-
sional districts... [for] forceful 'issue' advertisements that left [Demo-
cratic] candidates wondering what had hit them." 63  Over $300,000 was
spent in Little Rock and Jonesboro, Arkansas alone to help Hutchinson de-
feat Bryant.64 As with Vote Now '96, the Republic Education Fund did not
have to disclose its donors, could accept unlimited contributions, and could
receive foreign money.
65
II. NONPROFITS AND THE LAW
The activities of groups like Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education
Fund are arguably legal due to loopholes in the IRC and, ultimately, in
FECA. For the purposes of this Comment, there are three types of nonprofit
organizations: charities (formed under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); social welfare
groups (formed under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)); and political organizations
(formed under I.R.C. § 527). As indicated previously, Vote Now '96 was
an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charity; 66 the Republic Education Fund was an I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare group in 1996;67 and the DNC, a political party, is
an I.R.C. § 527 political organization.
68
61 See id. at 5982 ("[S]everal Triad donors had contributed the legal maximum in 'hard
dollars' to candidates who benefited from advertisements run by Triad's tax-exempt organi-
zation[.").
62 Gullo, supra note 30.
63 Carney, supra note 51, at 1640. For a discussion of political "issue advertisements,"
see infra note 103 and accompanying text, noting that "issue advocacy" is used "as a ruse for
partisan politicking."
rA See ANNENBERG, supra note 46, at 23 ("[T]he education fund paid for more than
$300,000 worth of television advertisements attacking Democratic Senate candidate Winston
Bryant. The media campaign ran in late October in Little Rock and Jonesboro.").
65 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (noting that the Republic Education
Fund's advertisements are considered to be "issue advocacy" that is not subject to election
limits); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the FECA requirements for political campaign ac-
tivity.
66 See supra note 20 (noting Vote Now '96's tax status).
67 See supra note 48 (noting the Republic Education Fund's tax status).
68 See supra note 24 (noting the DNC's tax status).
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A. Nonprofits and the IRC
1. Charities
The IRC offers a series of tradeoffs for the three categories of tax-
exempt nonprofit groups.69 Charities must operate exclusively for limited
and defined functions, such as for charitable, religious, or educational pur-
poses.7 ° Charities are also restricted in at least three other ways: such
groups cannot operate to the benefit of a specific individual;71 no "substan-
tial part 72 of their activities may be for "carrying on propaganda, or other-
wise attempting ... to influence legislation; '73 and no charity may "partici-
pate in, or intervene in... any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office."
74
The political limitations on charities, then, fall into two categories.
Charities are confronted with an absolute bar against taking part in political
campaign activity, which the IRC defines as participating in a campaign on
behalf of or in opposition to a political candidate.75 Not all political activ-
ity, however, rises to the level of campaign activity.76 As long as such ac-tions are not substantial, charities may engage in political (but noncam-
69 See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that charities, social welfare groups,
and political organizations are three categories of tax exempt, nonprofit groups).
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (noting that charities must be "operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition .... or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals").
71 See id. (prohibiting charities from operating for the benefit of a specific individual).
72 Id.
73 Id. The Supreme Court has found that "political propaganda" refers to a fill range of
advocacy. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477 (1987) (noting that propaganda may be
"slanted, misleading speech that does not merit serious attention" or advocacy that is "com-
pletely accurate and merit[s] the closest attention and the highest respect").
7V I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The limits placed on I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) groups prevent charities
from becoming "action organizations." 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1998) (stating that a
charity is not operated exclusively for an exempt purpose if it is an action organization). A
group is an "action organization" if a "substantial part of its activities is attempting to influ-
ence legislation by propaganda or otherwise;" "it participates or intervenes, directly or indi-
rectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public of-
fice;" or "[ilts main... objectives may be attained only by legislation or defeat of proposed
legislation" and it "advocates" these "objectives" instead of "engaging in nonpartisan analy-
sis ... and making the results thereof available to the public." Id.
75 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 394 (defining political campaign activity under the
IRC as participating or intervening in a political campaign on behalf of, or in opposition to, a
candidate for public office).
76 See id. at 408 ("The concept of 'political activity' is broader than the concept of 'po-
litical campaign activity.' That is, the political campaign intervention limitation applies only
upon the occurrence of a particular, defined subset of political activity.").
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paign) activities like lobbying to influence legislation. In return for follow-
ing these limitations on political and political campaign activity, charities
have the benefit of their donors receiving a tax deduction for contributions,
which encourages donations.
77
2. Social Welfare Groups
Social welfare groups, in contrast to charities, need only be "primarily
engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general welfare
of the people of the community."78 Consequently, such groups usually do
not receive the tax deduction benefits that charities typically enjoy. 9 Social
welfare organizations, however, have greater leeway in the political activi-
ties they may undertake.8s The primary mission of a social welfare group,
for instance, may be to lobby on legislative issues,81 something that no sub-
stantial part of a charity's activities may constitute.
"The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect
participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in oppo-
sition to any candidate for public office." 82 Because I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) non-
profit organizations only need be "primarily" engaged in social welfare,
however, social welfare groups-unlike charities-are not completely
barred from engaging in political campaign activities.8 3 Instead, any politi-
77 See I.R.C. § 170(c) (allowing federal income, estate, and gift tax deductions for contri-
butions to qualified charities).
78 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i).
79 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 433 ("A social welfare organization ... cannot attract
charitable contributions that are deductible for income, gift, and estate tax purposes."). But,
"[a] social welfare organization will qualify for exemption as a charitable organization if it
falls within the definition of charitable ... and is not an action organization." 26 C.F.R
§ 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i). For a description of "charitable" and "action organization," see supra
notes 70, 74.
80 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 433 ("[O]ne trade-off between [charities and social
welfare groups] is a somewhat greater scope of permissible political campaign activities as
opposed to deductible contributions as a source of revenue.").
An organization that is organized and operated to inform the public by educa-
tional methods on a subject of public interest and concern may be exempt under sec-
tion 501(c)(4) of the Code even though the subject evokes controversy and even
though the organization advocates a particular viewpoint and seeks changes in law to
reflect such viewpoint
Rev. Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216.
81 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 250 ("A social welfare organization may engage in any
type of lobbying effort, both direct and grass roots, as long as its primary purpose is the ad-
vancement of social welfare.").
82 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii).
83 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 ("Although the promotion of social wel-
fare... does not include political campaign activities, the regulations do not impose a com-
plete ban on such activities for section 501(c)(4) organizations.").
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cal campaign expenditure of a social welfare group is subject to the same
tax that would apply to certain income of-I.R.C. § 527 political organiza-
tions.84 Furthermore, political campaign activity of a social welfare group
must satisfy the FECA regulations, as outlined in Part II.B.
3. Political Organizations
Political organizations include any group "organized and operated pri-
marily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or
making expenditures" 85 to "influence the selection, nomination, election, or
appointment of any individual" for public office.86 As previously indicated,
contributions to political organizations are not tax deductible,87 and some
limited types of income of such groups are subject to taxation.88
B. Nonprofits and FECA
Almost all federal political campaigning-whether by political organi-
zations, social welfare groups, or others-is in some way subject to the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act.89 FECA, "landmark legislation" passed by
Congress in the 1970s, was intended to "resolve, once and for all, the ineq-
uities and abuses of the political finance system." 90 Among other things,
FECA places limits on the size of political campaign contributions,91 re-
84 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (1994) (requiring that any political campaign expenditure of
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations be "subject to tax... as if it constituted political
organization taxable income"); see also infra note 88 (noting that some gross income of po-
litical organizations is taxable).
85 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (1994).
86 Id. § 527(e)(2).
87 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 464 ("[I]ndividual donors are not entitled to claim a tax
credit for contributions to political organizations.").
88 See I.R.C. § 527(b)-(c) (imposing a tax on political organizations for gross income,
excluding exempt function income such as contributions or membership dues received, above
allowable deductions).
89 FECA exempts some minor activities from its requirements, such as allowing volun-
tary itemized reporting requirements for small political campaign contributions. See, e.g., 2
U.S.C. § 434(b)(3) (1994) (granting discretion to political committees to identify sources that
contribute an aggregate amount of $200 or less within a calendar year).
90 ANTHONY CORRADO, CREATIVE CAMPAIGNING: PACs AND THE PRESIDENTIAL
SELECTION PROCESS xiii (1992).
91 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994).
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quires regular disclosure of political contributions and expenditures, 92 andbars foreign citizens from making political contributions.93
III. NONPROFTS AND LEGAL LOOPHOLES
A. Fissures in the Law
Due to loopholes in the IRC and FECA, charities and social welfare
groups are able to engage in partisan activities, yet argue that their actions
are nonpolitical. Vote Now '96 claimed, for example, that it really was a
nonpartisan charity and simply engaged in the socially valuable function of
ensuring that historically disenfranchised minorities are able to vote.94 The
facts that the group registered Democrats and helped to get them to the
polls, was headed by former Democratic Party officials, benefited from a
White House fundraiser, and received large contributions steered to the
group by the DNC were, according to Vote Now '96, indirect consequences
of its taxpayer-subsidized, "nonpartisan" mission to increase minority voter
tuMout.
95
92 See id. § 434(a)(4) (requiring "[a]ll political committees other than authorized com-
mittees of a candidate" to file, among other things, "monthly reports in all calendar years
which shall be filed no later than the 20th day after the last day of the month").
93 See id. § 441e (prohibiting foreign nationals from making political contributions). A
possible loophole may exist, however, that allows foreigners to make "soft money" contribu-
tions to federal political party committees. See Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Partici-
pation of Non-citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503,
516 (1997) ("The use of 'soft money' . . . is... essentially unconstrained by FECA, suggest-
ing that foreign nationals may be able to make [soft money] contributions to the national po-
litical parties ... ."). For a discussion of soft money, see infra note 152, noting that soft
money is not subject to FECA regulations, yet often is used to influence federal elections. For
a discussion of Congress's intent to bar foreign soft money contributions, see infra note 199,
noting Congress's intent to prohibit foreign contributions from having any impact on U.S.
elections.
94 See Abramson & Wayne, supra note 35 (quoting a Vote Now '96 attorney as stating
that voter registration is the 'only interest' of the charity's financial supporters); Babcock &
Schmidt, supra note 41 (quoting a DNC spokesperson as stating that Vote Now '96 is "'a
voter participation project of importance to the DNC ... because of its effort to increase par-
ticipation in traditional[ly] disenfranchised, low income and minority communities'). See
generally DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE 206 (1990)
("Another source of undisclosed campaign-related expenditures is nonprofit foundations that
pursue voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives.... Although they are in principle non-
partisan, in fact they often focus their election activities on demographic groups that have pre-
dictable partisan tendencies."); Carney, supra note 51, at 1640 ("Leaders of politically active
tax-exempt groups maintain that they are educating the public and promoting legislative is-
sues, not influencing elections?).
95 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that Vote Now '96 operated to in-
crease minority voter turnout in heavily Democratic areas, but that the group claimed to be
nonpartisan).
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The law supports this claim. Voter registration and turnout efforts are
valid activities for a tax-exempt charity. 96 Targeting certain constituencies,
such as minorities, in voter registration efforts has also been found to be an
appropriate charitable purpose.
97
Even being the beneficiary of political party fundraisers and directed
contributions does not necessarily jeopardize a nonprofit organization's
charitable status. Political organizations are free to "steer donors" to non-
profit groups, provided that the political parties do not "tell the groups how
and where to spend the money they collect."98 Funds that charities receive
may come from foreign sources as well. 99 Finally, because charitable voter
turnout efforts are considered nonpolitical, groups like Vote Now '96 avoid
all election laws.
100
On the basis of the criteria listed above, Vote Now '96 emerges with a
clean slate. Apparently, the IRC and FECA need not follow common
sense--or at least "common suspicion"--that a group headed by Democrats,
funded by Democrats, and benefiting Democrats is a Democratic organiza-
tion. Provided that Vote Now '96 engaged in the "nonpartisan" activity of
registering voters, and was not overtly controlled by the Democratic Party,
it apparently satisfied the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to qualify as a
nonprofit group. Even though Vote Now '96 virtually operated as a Demo-
cratic Party subsidiary, its voter registration efforts were taxpayer-
subsidized and unregulated by FECA.
The legal loophole discovered by Vote Now '96, in many ways, is but a
slight fissure compared to the gaping crack that allowed the Republic Edu-
cation Fund to produce its "nonpolitical" television spots. As far as the IRC
and FECA are concerned, this group's advertisement about the government-
wasting, junket-taking, rapist-paroling, Democratic candidate Winston Bry-
96 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4945(f) (1994) (authorizing nonpartisan voter registration drives by
tax-exempt organizations as a permissible exempt activity). Under I.R.C. § 4945(f)(5), voter
registration efforts are considered nonpartisan for tax purposes if
contributions ... [to fund the] drives are not subject to conditions that they may be
used only in specified States, possessions of the United States, or political subdivi-
sions or other areas of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, or that they
may be used in only one specific election period.
Id.
97 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-40-044 (Oct. 6, 1995) (authorizing a charity's intention to
register "large numbers of female voters, particularly in minority communities" as a proper
activity).
99 Abramson & Wayne, supra note 35.
99 See, e.g., Babcock & Schmidt, supra note 41 (noting that foreigners "may legally con-
tribute to nonprofit groups").
1o0 See supra note 96 (noting that a qualified voter registration drive is a permissible
charitable activity).
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ant had as much to do with the campaign for a U.S. Senate seat as would a
commercial for Arkansas chickens. 10 This fact speaks to a larger problem
that permeates our campaign system, which is the use of "issue advo-
cacy"'1 2 as a ruse for partisan politicking.
0 3
Here are the "magic words" for regulated advocacy10 4 : "'vote for,'
'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
'defeat,' [and] 'reject."' 105 According to the Supreme Court in Buckley v.
Valeo, words and phrases similar to these must be used in order for a mes-
sage to be subject to FECA's regulations on "express advocacy" political
campaigning.1
6
The fundamental difference between express and issue advocacy is that
express advocacy-a message that specifically endorses the election or de-
feat of a candidate-is regulated by FECA, while issue advocacy-a mes-
sage that often criticizes a candidate, but does not encourage an action on
the part of the voter-is usually not. The Court, in an indirect admission
that this standard would be confusing in practice, acknowledged that ex-
press advocacy and issue advocacy are virtually indistinguishable in many
circumstances, even though only express advocacy is regulated by FECA.
107
101 See supra text accompanying note 46 (quoting the Republic Education Fund's anti-
Bryant ad).
102 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976) (permitting the "discussion of issues and
candidates" without necessarily becoming subject to limits on express advocacy); see also
ANINENBERG, supra note 46, at 3 ("Issue advocacy describes a communication to the public
whose primary purpose is to promote a set of ideas or policies.").
103 See, e.g., ANNENBERG, supra note 46, at 3 ("To the naked eye, ... issue advocacy ads
are often indistinguishable from ads run by candidates. But in a number of key respects, they
are different. Unlike candidates, issue advocacy groups face no contribution limits or disclo-
sure requirements. Nor can they be held accountable by the voters on election day.").
104 Id. at 4.
105 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
106 See id. at 44 (noting that FECA limits on express advocacy "must be construed to ap-
ply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office"); see also ANNENBERG, supra note
46, at 3 ("Express advocacy describes a communication to the public whose primary purpose
is to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate."). But see FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857,
864 (9th Cir. 1987) (ruling that an anti-President Jimmy Carter advertisement, which cau-
tioned voters "'Don't let him do it,' was express advocacy despite the absence of "magic
words" in the ad).
107
[IThe distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of elec-
tion or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates,
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative pro-
posals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of
their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of
public interest.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
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The Court's decision in Buckley has opened the floodgates for vicious,
partisan attacks that are free from election limits. As long as words such as
"vote against" or "defeat" are not used, nonprofit organizations are consid-
ered to be engaged only in "issue advocacy," and not FECA-regulated po-
litical campaigning, when they sponsor advertisements such as the Republic
Education Fund's anti-Bryant ad.1
0 8
This is one instance where a word or two can make a big difference.
Because express advocacy is political campaign activity, a social welfare
organization sponsoring such a message is subject to the set of restrictions
previously discussed: first, that I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations
primarily operate for a purpose unrelated to political campaign activity;1
0 9
second, FECA's regulations, such as reporting requirements, that apply to
almost all political campaign activity;" 0 and third, the IRC provision that
108 As nonprofit corporations, charities are subject to FECA's prohibition against corpo-
rate political campaigning. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994) ("It is unlawful for ... any corpora-
tion ... to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with [a federal election] ....").
Under Federal Election Commission ("FEC") regulations, the bar against corporate political
campaigning is violated if a corporation's communication, "when taken as a whole and with
limited reference to external events, such as the proximity of the election, could only be inter-
preted by a reasonable person" as advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.22(b) (1998) (emphasis added). This "reasonable person" test does not require that
"magic words" be used in order for a corporation to be found in violation of the 2 U.S.C. §
441b prohibition against corporate express advocacy. See Scott E. Thomas, Hot Issues-Have
the Courts Cooked the FECA?, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 1998: COMPLYING
wITH CAMPAIGN FINANCE, LOBBYING AND ETHIcs LAws 547, 549-50 (1998) (noting that the
FEC uses a "reasonable person approach" that does not require "magic words" to enforce
§ 441b). Under this standard, the Republic Education Fund's anti-Bryant advertisement ar-
guably could be considered express advocacy in violation of FECA's prohibition on corporate
political campaigning. The FEC's "reasonable person" standard, however, has been declared
unconstitutional by a number of courts. See id. at 550 (noting that the "[First] and [Fourth]
Circuits clearly will not enforce the FEC's 'reasonable person' 'express advocacy' definition,"
and that "[a] district court in the [Second] Circuit recently ruled [that] the FEC's 'express ad-
vocacy' definition was impermissible"). The standard has also been criticized as "defining
express advocacy through external events and the perception of others," which is "precisely"
what the Buckley Court rejected when ruling on other provisions of FECA. Bradley A. Smith,
Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J.
LEGIs. 179, 190 (1998). Putting aside issues of the constitutionality of the "reasonable per-
son" standard, the rule's effectiveness is highly questionable if an incorporated social welfare
organization like the Republic Education Fund can spend millions of dollars on advertise-
ments that any reasonable person would view as attacking Democratic candidates and still not
be cited for any violations of FECA.
109 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (noting that a social welfare group must
be engaged primarily in promoting the public good and that political campaigning is not con-
sidered to be such a purpose).
110 See supra Part lI.B (discussing examples of the FECA's requirements for political
campaign activity).
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any political campaign expenditure by a social welfare group is subject to
taxation.'
Absent the magic words, though, a nonprofit organization may pay for
an advertisement that looks suspiciously partisan, label it "issue advocacy,"
and avoid all limits on political campaign activity imposed by the IRC or
FECA. In fact, the Republic Education Fund did just that. The group was
created less than seven months before the 1996 general election, and the
only "primary activity" it engaged in-likely the only activity it engaged in
at all-was producing advertisements attacking Democrats." 2 For the Re-
public Education Fund, bumping off (electorally speaking) Democratic can-
didates was its means of promoting the public good, and all of this was done
outside the scope of the election laws.
B. The Nonprofit Political Incentive
As the IRC and FECA now stand, an incentive exists for political par-
ties and candidates to channel activities that they would otherwise pay for
out of their own campaign coffers to nonprofit groups. Taxpayers help pay
for all activities of an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization provided
that the charity's "political" activity, which is often narrowly defined," 3 is
not substantial and it obeys the political campaign prohibition. For both
charities and social welfare groups, then, independent political activity that
does not rise to the level of political campaigning is unregulated by FECA,
enabling nonprofit organizations to accept limitless contributions, even from
foreign nationals, without having to comply with disclosure requirements.
C. Nonprofits and Politics: An Inevitable Mix?
Serving as the "political equivalent of Swiss bank accounts," charities
and social welfare groups are now secret havens where political parties and
candidates stash unlimited contributions and foreign money received from
III See supra notes 84, 88 and accompanying text (noting that the political campaign ex-
penditures of social welfare groups are subject to the same taxes that apply to some limited
types of political party income).
"2 See 5 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIvITIEs, supra note
26, at 6301 (Minority Views) (noting that the Republic Education Fund "has [n]ever engaged
in any service or activity other than paying for the production and airing of political advertis-
ing'7i s
For example, with minimal requirements, "political" activity does not include even
voter registration drives in targeted communities. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text (noting that voter registration drives, including those in targeted communities, are non-
partisan activities in which a charity or social welfare group may engage).
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anonymous donors." 4  Often directed by professional consultants, these
nonprofit groups, camouflaged behind virtuous sounding names, such as
Citizens for the Republic Education Fund," 5 run the "'shadow' cam-
paigns"' 6-underground politicking that can determine an election's out-
come with a barrage of negative advertisements during the waning days of a
campaign and after the actual candidates emptied their own coffers.
Even if attempts are made to plug the legal loopholes, the odds are
stacked against efforts to prevent nonprofit organizations from jumping into
the political morass. Many of these groups are phantom organizations that
live and die by elections.17 There is little way to police their actions until
after the debates are over, the ballots are counted, and the winners' bags are
packed for Washington, D.C.
118
114 Abramson & Wayne, supra note 35.
115
[Nonprofit groups] who market their agendas to voters have come to realize that the
name of the messenger is at least as important, if not more so, than the ideas for
sale.... Often, the names bear little conviction to what's being communicated, or
are so innocuous as to give no hint to who or what is behind them.
Ken Foskett, Tax Exempts-The Hidden Force: An Interest Group by Any Other
Name... Might Not Succeed, ATLANTA J., May 31, 1998, at A8.
116 Lance Gay, Loopholes Gape for Elections in 2000, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct.
24, 1997, at 12A.
117 The social welfare group Citizens for Reform offers a telling example of the short life
span of many nonprofit organizations apparently organized with the sole purpose of influenc-
ing elections. Citizens for Reform was headed by Peter Flaherty, a "conservative Republican
activist" who "also [ran] the Conservative Campaign Fund" and was "chairman of Citizens for
Reagan." ANNENBERG, supra note 46, at 21. The group was founded in May 1996, and, like
the Republic Education Fund, was a client of TRIAD. See id. (describing the activities of
Citizens for Reform). Citizens for Reform lay dormant, however, until October 11, 1996,
"when it opened a bank account." Abramson & Wayne, supra note 35. "In the next 20
days.... the group ... received $1.6 million from Triad donors in 12 bank transactions." Id.
By the general election, on November 5, 1996, Citizens for Reform spent $2 million on ad-
vertisements such as the following: "Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but
he took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's explanation? He 'only slapped her.' But her
nose was broken." ANNENBERG, supra note 46, at 4. This issue advocacy advertisement was
"cited by political analysts as tipping a tight race" in favor of the Republican running against
Yellowtail, a Democratic candidate for Congress. Id.
118
[E]nforcement [by the I.R.S. against nonprofit groups engaging in prohibited politi-
cal activity] is based largely upon annual information returns filed by exempt or-
ganizations themselves. Given the relatively brief existence of the [nonprofits], by
the time the I.R.S. ha[s] the information in hand, it [i]s often too late to respond ef-
fectively. If the organization ha[s] not already ceased operating, all the I.R.S. c[an]
do in response to violations [i]s to revoke the organization's exempt status. Deduc-
tions taken for donations to [charitable] organization[s] before revocation cannot be
retroactively disallowed.
Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax Ex-
emption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politicians, 51
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Government watchdog agencies, such as the IRS or the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") are more like toothless Chihuahuas when it comes to
supervising nonprofit organizations. Monitoring tax-exempt organizations
is "something of a sideline" 119 for the IRS since it rarely results in any
money being paid into the Treasury.1 20  The FEC, the "independent
agency... with the exclusive authority to 'administer, seek to obtain com-
pliance with, and formulate policy with respect to' the [FECA],' 21 is noto-
riously overworked and has its hands full just trying to keep track of the
groups that are allowed to engage in political campaign activity. 22 As pres-
ently organized, the agency cannot effectively police nonprofit organiza-
tions that, for the most part, are supposed to be outside of FECA's regula-
tory purview.
The "general lack of oversight" by the IRS and the FEC has so troubled
many nonprofit organizations that these groups have "asked Congress to
provide more controls, lest bad charities [and social welfare groups] effec-
tively drive out the good ones-or dissuade people from supporting
U. Prrr. L. REV. 577, 593 (1990) (footnote omitted); see also George Rodrigue, ForAmer-
ica's Nonprofit Sector, the Watchdog Seldom Barks, NIEMAN REP., Mar. 22, 1998, at 50, 56
(noting that when journalists attempted to investigate the activities of nonprofit groups like the
Republic Education Fund in 1996, they "could learn precious little" because the nonprofit
groups' "tax returns [were] not due until months after [the] election"); infra note 122 and ac-
companying text (discussing the FEC's ineffectiveness in policing campaign abuses).
Ch9 isolm, supra note 118, at 593.
120 See Lobbying and Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 222, 234
(1987) (testimony of Sheldon S. Cohen, former IRS Commissioner) ("The major function of
the IRS is to bring in revenue and an exempt function is specifically designed not to bring in
revenue. Therefore, no matter how you enforce it, you are not going to get enough money out
of it to spit at, to put it crudely."); see also Carney, supra note 51, at 1643 ("The IRS ... lacks
the staff and budget to enforce the law .... The IRS division in charge of nonprofits has had
a flat budget for decades"); Rodrigue, supra note 118, at 53 ("[TIhe [RS], the only nation-
wide regulator of nonprofits, is overwhelmed.... [A] group [can] expect to go 50 to 100
years, statistically speaking, without an IRS audit.").
121 Kenneth A. Gross, The Federal Election Commission Compliance, and Enforcement
Procedures Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, in FUNDING FEDERAL POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNs: PACs, CORPORATE AcTvmrnEs AND CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LOBBYING LAws
211,213 (1986) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 437c-(b)(1) (1986)).
122
[The FEC] has neither the will nor the means to deter wanton violators [of FECA],
who sometimes ridicule openly the commission's weakness. It has interpreted the
law so permissively that special interest groups may funnel money to candidates
practically without limit if they wish. And those who wish to evade or violate elec-
tion laws have had little to fear from the FEC. It often overrules its own staff's rec-
ommendations to investigate suspected infractions, and it can consume years re-
solving even a relatively simple case.
BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECnON CoNmMssiON FAILED
1(1990).
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them."'1 3  In this "'Wild West"' of American politics, where nonprofit
groups can "'get away with almost anything," ' 124 a new sheriff is desper-
ately needed to replace the ineffective law enforcement by the IRS and the
FEC.
IV. CLIPPING NONPROFITS' POLITICAL WINGS
A. A Call for Nonprofit PACs
"If you can't beat 'em, join 'em" may not go far as a motivational, ral-
lying cry for revising our nation's laws, but this may be one case where the
motto should apply. Allowing nonprofit organizations to engage in regu-
lated political and political campaign activity will accomplish at least three
things: nonprofit political activity will be permissible, but subject to public
scrutiny and election law safeguards; agencies like the IRS and the FEC
could therefore better focus on those nonprofit groups that continue to cir-
cumvent the law; and the IRC and FECA will take a step toward reality, in-
stead of existing in a fantasy land where calling a candidate a "rapist pa-
roler ' 125 or "wife beater"'126 on the eve of an election is considered
apolitical.
A charity that intends to engage in political activity prohib-
ited by its I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) tax status is already permitted to establish an
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social welfare subsidiary. 27 The IRS only requires that
a charity and its social welfare arm be separately incorporated and that
contributions to the charity that are entitled to a tax deduction not be
used to finance the subsidiary's lobbying or propaganda-promoting activi-
ties.
1 28
Aside from maintaining independent bank accounts, a charity and its
lobbying arm may coordinate their efforts and engage in the activities per-
123 Rodrigue, supra note 118, at 53.
124 Jim Drinkard, "Issue Advocacy" Groups: The New Electoral Power, USA TODAY,
Mar. 9, 1998, at 13A (quoting Stuart Rothenberg, a political analyst).
125 See supra text accompanying note 46 (quoting the Republic Education Fund's anti-
Bryant advertisement).
126 See supra note 117 (quoting the Citizens for Reform's anti-Yellowtail advertisement).
127 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 250 ("A charitable organization that is operating un-
der the substantial part test can, in general, establish an affiliated tax-exempt organization for
the purpose of engaging in substantial lobbying activities.").
128 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 n.6 (1983) ("The IRS
apparently requires only that [a charity and social welfare group] be separately incorporated
and keep records adequate to show that tax deductible contributions are not used to pay for
lobbying.").
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mitted by their respective tax-exempt status. 129 Using the lobbying subsidi-
ary as a model, the IRC and FECA should be amended to allow both I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) charities and § 501(c)(4) social welfare groups to establish
"nonprofit PACs," which would be similar (but not identical) to other fed-
eral PACs.
1. PACs Defined
"The term political action committees, one that does not appear any-
where in the FECA, denotes a loose category of all the committees in fed-
eral campaigns other than political party committees and the official cam-
paign committees of candidates."' 30 Such PACs include "any committee,
club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 or which makes expenditures aggregating in
excess of $1,000 during a calendar year."'
131
Contributions by individuals to PACs are capped at $5,000 per elec-
tion.132 Primary and general elections have separate caps, allowing an indi-
vidual to give $5,000 to a PAC in each election. 133 A PAC may contribute
up to $1,000 per candidate in each election, the same limit that applies to
individuals, unless the organization qualifies as a multi-candidate PAC.1
34
To become a multi-candidate PAC, a committee must be registered as such
at least six months prior to an election, receive contributions from more than
fifty people, and make contributions to at least five candidates for public of-
fice. 135 Multi-candidate PACs may contribute up to $5,000 per candidate in
each election.
136
Other types of groups that are barred from directly taking part in politi-
cal campaign activity are allowed to form PACs. Corporations and labor
129
The activities of a [PAC] that is affiliated with a charitable organization will be
attributed to the charitable organization for purposes of determining the ongoing tax-
exempt status of the charitable organization.
... [As long as the PAC engages in political activity that is not political cam-
paign activity,] ... a charitable organization can establish an affiliated [PAC] and
not lose its tax-exempt status ....
HOPKINs, supra note 24, at 426-27.
130 FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALrrEs 100 (1992).
131 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (1998).
132 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a-(a)(1)(C) (1994).
133 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.2(b)-(c).
134 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a-(a)(1)(A).
135 See id. § 44la-(a)(4).
136 See id. § 441a-(a)(2)(A).
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unions, both of which are prohibited from making political contributions
from their general treasury funds, may form PACs that solicit or make po-
litical contributions through separate segregated funds ("SSFs"). 137 Non-
profit groups should similarly be allowed to engage in political and political
campaign activity via a political subsidiary.
138
FECA permits charities and social welfare organizations to create
regular and multi-candidate PACs. 139 The IRC, however, effectively stands
as a bar to charities creating PACs, because these groups are prohibited
from engaging in political campaign activity, and any "political campaign
activities of an SSF are attributed back to the charitable organization that
sponsors it.,,1 40  Similarly, the IRC restricts the ability of social welfare
groups to start a PAC due to the "limit on the amount of political campaign
activity in which they can engage without loss of tax-exempt status."
141
Charities and social welfare groups often evade these limitations by simply
establishing informal ties with like-minded PACs.
142
2. Nonprofit PAC Requirements for Political Campaign Activity
Political campaign activity, as defined by the IRC, is any activity taken
on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate for public office. 43 Political
campaigning includes directly contributing money to a candidate's cam-
137 See id. § 441b-(a) (prohibiting corporations or labor unions from making political
contributions); id. § 441b-(b)(2)(C) (permitting corporations or labor unions to form PACs by
establishing "separate segregated fund[s]" that are not subject to the political contribution
prohibition).
138 See, e.g., Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Co-
existence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 352 (1990) (arguing that charities should be permitted
to establish political subsidiaries under I.R.C. § 527).
139 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 426-28 (noting that charities and social welfare
groups, according to election law, can establish PACs). The FEC, in an advisory opinion,
even has "sanction[ed] the concept of" the managers of a charity establishing an independent
PAC in order to engage in political campaign activity without jeopardizing the charity's tax
status. Id. at 427. "mhe IRS has yet to address this matter.... HOPKINS, supra note 24, at
427.
140 HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 491.
141 Id. at 428.
142 See Anne H. Bedlington, Loopholes and Abuses, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND
DEMOCRACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 69, 83 (Margaret Latus
Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990) ("Some tax-exempt organizations are being misused
to save money for their informally affiliated PAC, thus leaving the PAC with more money to
spend on candidate contributions or independent expenditures.").
143 See supra note 75 (defining political campaign activity).
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paign or engaging in express advocacy, described in Buckley as urging vot-
ers to "vote for" or "defeat" a candidate.
14
At present, charities are barred from engaging in direct political cam-
paign activity. This prohibition, therefore, prevents charities from making
financial contributions for, or taking part in, express advocacy. Social wel-
fare groups are similarly limited, but to a lesser extent. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
nonprofit groups may engage in some political campaign activity-and,
thus, make contributions for, or engage in, express advocacy-provided that
such groups are primarily operated to promote the public good in some
other way.
With the creation of nonprofit PACs, charities and social welfare
groups could freely contribute or engage in express advocacy through non-
profit PACs. These political subsidiaries will be subject to many of the
FECA requirements that apply to all other federal PACs, such as contribu-
tion limits, frequent disclosure reports to the FEC, and the prohibition
against receiving foreign money.1 45 Funds contributed to a charity or social
welfare organization will be held in separate accounts, ensuring, for exam-
ple, that no tax-deductible contributions are used to finance any of a chari-
table, nonprofit PAC's activities. All political campaigning of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations will be required to be conducted
through such nonprofit PACs.
3. Nonprofit PAC Requirements for Noncampaign Political Activity
Allowing charities and social welfare organizations to make political
contributions and engage in express advocacy, does not, of course, address
most of the pursuits of groups like Vote Now '96 and the Republic Educa-
tion Fund. As indicated before, both of those nonprofit groups arguably
could claim that their activities were already legal and that political cam-
paign activity was avoided.146
With the existence of nonprofit PACs, Vote Now '96 and the Republic
Education Fund could conduct their respective voter registration drives and
issue advertisements through PAC subsidiaries. An incentive still exists,
- however, to run activities that do not qualify as political campaign activity
through the existing charity or social welfare organization. These groups
144 See supra text accompanying note 105 (listing Buckley's examples of express advo-
cacy?.
See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (listing examples of FECA's require-
ments).
146 See supra Part II.A (noting that Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education Fund
claim that their activities were not political campaigning under existing IRC and FECA regu-
lations).
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are not managed by the Mother Teresas of the nonprofit world, after all.147
Given the option to use taxpayer-subsidized funds,148 delve into foreign
money, and avoid disclosure requirements, Vote Now '96 and the Republic
Education Fund likely will not alter their existing game plan anytime soon.
The solution to this dilemma is to eliminate the option available to non-
profit groups to sponsor any "political" activity outside of PACs. Using
common sense and an informed understanding of the realities of contempo-
rary politics as guideposts, anything that looks, sounds, or "walks" like po-
litical campaign activity should be expressly required 149 to be conducted
through a nonprofit PAC. °50 Notwithstanding claims by charities and social
welfare groups that their endeavors have nothing to do with elections, at a
minimum, activities like voter registration drives or "issue" advertisements
in which candidates are pictured or discussed should be prohibited unless
conducted by a nonprofit PAC.
Applying election laws to the activities of nonprofit PACs will clip the
political wings of groups like Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education
Fund. Under FECA, all PACs are subject to disclosure requirements and
contribution limits and are prohibited from accepting foreign money-re-
gardless of how funds are spent.151 The "soft money" loophole, which al-
lows federal PACs to engage in issue advocacy, voter registration and get-
147 Some nonprofit groups will go to great lengths to circumvent-or break--the law.
For example, in 1986, it was revealed that the National Endowment for the Preservation of
Liberty, an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charity, had "engag[ed] in campaign efforts against members of
Congress who opposed aid to the [Nicaraguan] Contras and, to add insult to in-
jury ... allegedly fmanc[ed] these efforts with profits from arms sales to Iran." Chisolm, su-
pra note 138, at 309 (footnotes omitted). See generally Rodrigue, supra note 118, at 52 ("The
structure of nonprofits partly explains the problem of misuse of funds. They lack many of the
checks and balances built into private businesses.").
148 As previously discussed, charities, not social welfare groups, typically are the only
nonprofits to receive this benefit. See supra Part II.A.2.
4 Specifically defining what activities are "political" and must be conducted through a
nonprofit PAC should overcome the Court's objections that general definitions of prohibited
political activity may be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976)
(noting that an "indefinite" definition of prohibited political activity that "falls to clearly mark
the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech" is unconstitutional); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.").
150 Government agencies like the FEC or IRS could be required to develop guidelines
expressly dictating what activities must be conducted through a nonprofit PAC, with nonprofit
groups free to contact these agencies for advice or approval for specific projects if any regula-
tion seems unclear. Also, some "political" activity can be exempted from the PAC require-
ment, such as certain types of legislative lobbying, so that I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social welfare
groups-which are often formed for the sole purpose of engaging in the political activity of
lobbying-can continue to exist, independent of a PAC.
See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (listing examples of FECA's require-
ments).
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out-the-vote drives, or related activities through non-FECA-regulated state
SSFs, could be closed by requiring nonprofit PACs to operate only federal
accounts.1 52  As a result, all specifically-defined "political" activities of
charities and social welfare groups will be subject to FECA, removing a
primary incentive for candidates and political parties to conduct partisan ac-
tivities through groups like Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education Fund.
B. Keeping Wayward Nonprofits in the Political Corral
Assuming that at least some charities and social welfare groups comply
with the letter and spirit of the law by forming PACs, the government's job
of monitoring the political activities of nonprofit organizations should be-
come easier. Fundamentally, nonprofit groups will have a bright line that
they know not to cross: do not engage in any prohibited political activity,
except through a PAC. As a result, the IRS will not have to haggle as often
about what constitutes "substantial propaganda" for a charity or whether a
social welfare group is failing to operate "primarily" for the public good.
The FEC will receive more paperwork in the form of regular disclosure re-
ports from nonprofit PACs, but having ready access to the disclosed infor-
152 Soft money "refer[s] to funds that are not subject to the provisions of [FECA] but are
used to influence the outcome of a federal election." CORRADO, supra note 90, at 6. Con-
gress created the soft money loophole in 1979, in response to criticisms that FECA
reduced the traditional role of state and local [political] party organizations in federal
elections and discouraged certain party-building activities. In order to redress this
grievance and increase the role of parties in federal contests, the 1979 [amendments
to FECA] exempted certain state and local party activities from the act's definition
of "contribution" and "expenditure." This allowed party organizations to raise and
spend unlimited amounts of money for voter registration, campaign materials, get-
out-the-vote drives, and other activities without having to disclose these funds to the
[FEC].
T1he 1979 amendments made no specific provision for the use of nonfederal soft
money accounts by nonparty political committees. The use of separate nonfederal
accounts by PACs is ... a result of the ambiguities of federal law rather than its par-
ticular sanctions.
Id. at 12, 121 (footnote omitted).
Unregulated get-out-the-vote drives or issue advocacy advertisements, then, are typically
run through state political parties, state PACs, and nonfederal accounts of federal PACs. Be-
cause such organizations, in these cases, are subject only to state election laws, they may "re-
ceive contributions in excess of the amount permitted by federal statutes, [and] solicit funds
from sources long prohibited from participating in federal elections .... They can also oper-
ate in relative secrecy because most state disclosure laws lack the rigorous requirements for
public disclosure established at the federal level." Id. at 121-22. This soft money loophole
can be closed, however, by requiring all nonprofit PACs to be federal (making them subject to
FECA) and by prohibiting them from establishing nonfederal soft money accounts.
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mation should prove valuable to any FEC investigation of possible FECA
violations by a nonprofit group.
For nonprofit organizations attempting to sponsor prohibited political
activity, the sanctions are, and will remain, severe. Under the IRC, if a
nonprofit organization engages in forbidden political activity, the IRS may
impose "substantial excise tax penalties on errant organizations and their
managers," and may "move swiftly... to revoke the exempt status of or-
ganizations that are determined to be in 'flagrant violation' of the proscrip-
tion on political expenditures."'153 These penalties will remain in place, al-
though the scope of prohibited political activity-unless accomplished
through a nonprofit PAC-will be expanded. Any FECA violations by
charities or social welfare groups will also be subject to the range of inves-
tigatory and prosecutorial powers possessed by the FEC."'
By thinning the herd of nonprofit groups attempting to evade the IRC
and FECA, the IRS and FEC possibly can serve as the alert watchdogs they
were intended to be. Any political activity by a charity or social welfare
group without a PAC will be per se illegal, and subject to the arsenal of
penalties both agencies possess, but use too rarely due to loopholes in the
law.
C. Seeking the Constitution's Seal ofApproval
Advocating any proposal that may be viewed as restricting the First
Amendment rights of nonprofit groups is fraught with danger. This is
hardly an area of the law known for its unanimity of opinion regarding what
the Constitution permits.' 55 Debate is likely to rage on in Congress about
the extent to which nonprofit groups' political activity may be limited.
Forecasting the outcome of this policy crap shoot, let alone what the Court
153 Chisolm, supra note 138, at 318-19 (quoting I.R.C. § 6852 (Supp. V 1987)); see also
I.R.C. § 4955 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (imposing taxes on prohibited political expenditures of
charities); I.R.C. § 7409 (1994) (allowing the IRS to seek an injunction against charities fla-
grantly violating political expenditure limits).
154 See 2 U.S.C. § 437(d) (1994).
155 See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Case for Campaign Finance Reform, I GREEN BAG 2D
289, 291 (1998) ("The Supreme Court today ... [is] very much divided on [issues such as
whether issue advocacy ads may be prohibited] .... And it's awfully hard to prejudge where
[the Court] will come down [on these issues]."). Compare 6 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996
ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN AcTIvrriEs, supra note 26, at 9546 (Minority Views) (Additional views
of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman) (arguing that proposals to "forbid [nonprofit groups from]
run[ning] advertisements ... identifying a candidate within 60 days of a general election or 30
days of a primary election" would "pass constitutional muster"), with Smith, supra note 108,
at 192 (arguing that restricting nonprofit organizations from sponsoring issue advertisements
identifying candidates within 60 days of a general election is "truly silly and blatantly uncon-
stitutional").
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however, that requiring nonprofit groups to engage in campaigning and
other political activities only through PACs is constitutional.
1. The Constitutionality of the Nonprofit PAC Requirement for
Political Campaign Activity
Requiring charities and social welfare groups to engage in political
campaign activity, such as contributing money to candidates or taking part
in express advocacy, through nonprofit PACs arguably survives constitu-
tional scrutiny. Currently, charities are barred from directly sponsoring
such activities, so the ability to form a PAC will be an unexpected boon.
Social welfare groups, in effect, already form PACs when they engage in
the limited political campaign activity permitted by the IRC, because such
activities are typically paid for out of SSFs.1
5 6
One stumbling-block in the way of the nonprofit PAC proposal, though,
is the Supreme Court's decision in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc. ("MCFL").157 In MCFL, the Court held that a nonprofit group with no
business activities or ties to a for-profit corporation cannot be required to
engage in independent express advocacy 15 through an SSF.159
Justice Brennan, the author of the MCFL Court's opinion, cited several
reasons why nonprofit groups resembling "voluntary political associa-
tions'16° cannot be required to establish PACs for independent expenditures.
First, "ideological" nonprofit groups do not have access to business income
that might enable them to "gain [an] unfair advantage in the political mar-
ketplace.'61  Because the risk of corporate financial power being used to
corrupt the political process is the usual justification given for prohibiting
corporations from using their general treasury funds for political purposes,
requiring ideological, nonprofit groups with no business income to establish
156 See HOPKINS, supra note 24, at 427 (noting that FECA permits social welfare groups
to create PACs).
157 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
158 An independent expenditure is defined as "an expenditure by a person expressly ad-
vocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without coop-
eration or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such can-
didate ... " 2 U.S.C. § 431(17).
159 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263-64 (holding that a nonprofit organization cannot be required
to engage in independent express advocacy through an SSF if(1) the group does not "engage
in business activities"; (2) the group has "no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to
have a claim on its assets or earnings"; and (3) the group is not established or funded by busi-
ness corporations or labor unions).
160 Id. at 263.
161 Id.; see also id. at 258-59 (arguing that funds available to business corporations are
unrelated to the "popular support for the corporation's political ideas," while resources avail-
able to an ideological, nonprofit group reflect "its popularity in the political marketplace").
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corporations from using their general treasury funds for political purposes,
requiring ideological, nonprofit groups with no business income to establish
PACs for independent political campaigning is unnecessary. 62 Second, an
SSF only may solicit funds from a narrowly defined class of a nonprofit
group's "members," which could severely restrict the ability of some groups
to raise money for political campaign activity. 63  Third, Brennan argued
that FECA's "extensive" organizational and reporting requirements for
PACs would unconstitutionally burden nonprofit groups, such as small
groups of "like-minded persons" who may seek to fund their "occasional
endorsement of political candidates... by means of garage sales, bake
sales, and raffles."'
164
MCFL is far from a victory for nonprofit groups seeking to engage in
unfettered political campaign activity. Under the decision, I.R.C. §
501(c)(4) organizations must still establish SSFs for nonindependent politi-
cal campaigning, such as express advocacy that is coordinated with a candi-
date. IRC limitations on the extent of political campaign activity by chari-
ties and social welfare groups also remain in place. All social welfare
organizations, including those covered by MCFL, must operate primarily for
purposes other than political campaigning. 16  Charities are similarly re-
stricted in that they can engage in only limited political activities and no
political campaigning. 166 Finally, a nonprofit organization closely associ-
ated with a for-profit business, such as the Republic Education Fund's ties
to TRIAD, is not protected by MCFL.1
67
In a number of ways, then, the nonprofit PAC requirement would pro-
vide more freedom than the current law for charities and social welfare
groups to engage in political campaign activity. With the creation of non-
profit PACs, charities and social welfare groups could engage in unlimited
political campaigning, but only through FECA-regulated SSFs. Further-
more, any questions raised by MCFL about the constitutionality of the non-
162 See id. at 263-64 (holding that concerns about corporate wealth as a "threat to the po-
litical marketplace" are unwarranted where corporations with "features more akin to voluntary
political associations than business firms" are engaged in independent political campaigning).
163 See id. at 260 ("The limitation on solicitation... means that nonmember corporations
can hardly raise any funds at all. ); see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b-(b)(4)(A)-(C) (1994) (re-
quiring that an SSF only solicit a corporation's stockholders and their families, the corpora-
tion's executive or administrative personnel and their families, or the members of a labor or-
ganization and their families, if the group is a membership corporation without capital stock).
164 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 254-55.
165 See supra Part HI.A.2 (discussing the requirements for I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) tax status).
166 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the requirements for I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) tax status).
167 See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264 (stating that a nonprofit group can only make an inde-
pendent expenditure without a PAC if the group is "not established by a business corpora-
tion. . . and it is [the group's] policy not to accept contributions from such entities").
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profit PAC proposal can be remedied by making slight changes to the PAC
requirement or the existing laws governing nonprofit organizations.
A primary objection raised by Brennan, for instance, was that ideologi-
cal, nonprofit groups should not be forced to establish SSFs for independent
expenditures because such groups do not generate business income that can
be used to corrupt the political process. This ruling should not be fatal to
the nonprofit PAC requirement, however, because it is based on current
laws that permit nonprofit groups to engage in some degree of political ac-
tivity without jeopardizing their tax status.
The Court held that the political and political campaign activities of
charities and social welfare groups can be restricted, due to the fact that
such organizations are taxpayer-subsidized 168 and benefit from the "special
advantages that the State confers on the corporate form." 169 It is only by
legislative grace that I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) tax status allows social welfare
groups to participate in some political campaign activity. Congress can
easily change the tax code to ban social welfare groups from taking part in
any such activity, even through SSFs,
170 as is the case for charities.171
From this perspective, MCFL holds only that ideological, nonprofit or-
ganizations engaged in independent campaign activities permitted by their
tax status cannot be required to establish SSFs. By altering the IRC to cre-
ate a blanket prohibition on political campaign activity by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
or § 501(c)(4) nonprofit groups without SSFs, the problems presented by
MCFL are avoided, a fact indirectly affirmed by the Court.
17 2
A second issue raised by MCFL is the solicitation limitations placed on
SSFs that prevent a nonprofit group from contacting even "those persons
who have... contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the
past." 173 This constraint could fatally handicap the ability of many non-
profit groups to raise sufficient funds to "engage in political speech war-
168 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting that the tax-exempt status of chari-
ties and social welfare groups, as well as the tax deductibility of contributions to charities, are
subsidies).
169 FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,495 (1985).
170 See 6 FNAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, supra note
26, at 9546 (Minority Views) (Additional views of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman) (arguing that
nonprofit organizations can be prohibited from engaging in political campaign activity due to
the government subsidies that such groups receive under their tax-exempt status).
q71 See supra text accompanying note 140 (noting that the IRC bars charities from en-
gagin in political campaigning).
See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262 (noting that the extent to which an ideological, nonprofit
group can participate in political campaign activity is ultimately limited by the group's tax
Id. at 254 (citing FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 204 (1982)).
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ranting the highest constitutional protection. 174 Therefore, the "member"
requirement and similar restrictions 75 on SSF solicitations should be elimi-
nated (or loosened, if constitutionally acceptable standards can be devel-
oped) for ideological, nonprofit PACs.
176
The last major hurdle presented by MCFL is FECA's organizational and
reporting requirements for PACs, discussed in detail by Justice Brennan.
177
Justice Brennan warned that such mandates may chill political speech, with
some nonprofit groups, "[f]aced with the need to assume a more sophisti-
cated organizational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file
periodic detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales," deciding "that the
contemplated political activity [is] simply not worth it." 178 It is important to
note, however, that Justice Brennan's objections are not part of MCFL's
holding, as they appear in the only portion of his opinion not adopted by the
Court. 7 9 In fact, at least four other Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
expressly rejected Justice Brennan's claims that such "burdens" on non-
profit groups engaged in political campaign activity are unconstitutional.
180
Still, it should be obvious that the Republic Education Fund and Vote
Now '96 are the types of culprits that create the need for nonprofit PACs. It
is hardly going out on a limb to allege that these groups have never funded
their activities through "bake sales," and it is unlikely that such organiza-
tions, run by highly sophisticated political professionals, will find FECA's
requirements to be so complicated that any desired political campaign
activity will be abandoned. Reasonable guidelines should be considered
that will establish a level of political campaign activity that must be sur-
passed for an ideological, nonprofit organization to become subject to the
PAC requirement. 181 For groups that remain below this threshold, the usual,
174 Id. at 260.
175 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441b-(b)(4)(B) (1994) (limiting SSFs to "[two] written solicita-
tions for contributions during the calendar year").
176 But see MCFL, 479 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that it is constitutional to require a nonprofit group's independent expenditures
to be made through SSFs that are subject to solicitation restrictions).
177 See id. at 253-55 (listing FECA requirements for PACs, such as provisions that all
committees must appoint a treasurer, file reports with the FEC, and keep records of contribu-
tions).
178 Id. at 255.
179 See id. at 241.
180 See id. at 270-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Congress has the power to require nonprofit
organizations to engage in independent expenditures only through PACs).
181 Such guidelines will be similar to FECA's requirement that any group receiving con-
tributions, or making political campaign expenditures, in excess of $1,000 in a calendar year
must establish a PAC. See text accompanying supra note 131 (stating that a group becomes a
political committee once it receives $1,000 in contributions or makes $1,000 in expenditures).
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less stringent FECA regulations for political campaign activity will still ap-
ply.
182
With only minor changes to the nonprofit PAC proposal, requiring
charities and social welfare groups to engage in political campaign activity
only through SSFs seems to satisfy any constitutional concerns. Both I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations likely will find that the ability to
make direct campaign contributions and to engage in express advocacy via
PAC subsidiaries will entail much gain with little pain.
2. The Constitutionality of the Nonprofit PAC Requirement for
Noncampaign Political Activity
The real First Amendment battleground for nonprofit PACs is the re-
quirement that charities and social welfare groups must route all political
activities-including noncampaign activities-through SSFs subject to
FECA. This issue is difficult to discuss without getting sucked into a con-
stitutional black hole, where different opinions as to what the Court will al-
low swirl about and frequently collide. 183 In defense of the nonprofit PAC
requirement, however, justifications exist for insisting that the political ac-
tivities of charities and social welfare groups only be conducted by SSFs
and that such a requirement is constitutional.
As discussed in Part IV.C.1, the political campaign activities of chari-
ties and social welfare groups may be restricted due to the benefits these
nonprofit groups enjoy as taxpayer-subsidized corporate entities.18 The
noncampaign political activity of such groups can be restricted under similar
reasoning, as is illustrated by the IRC mandate that no substantial part of a
charity's activity may be for propaganda purposes or for influencing legis-
lation. "' The First Amendment should not prevent further express limits on
In MCFL, the nonprofit group spent almost $10,000 to independently publish and distribute
over 100,000 copies of a guide that rated candidates on anti-abortion issues. See MCFL, 479
U.S. at 243-44 (describing the activities of Massachusetts Citizens for Life in the 1978 elec-
tions). This appears to be the type of large-scale, independent political campaign activity that
should be sufficient to make a group subject to the nonprofit PAC requirement.
182 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1994) (requiring "[e]very person (other than a political
committee) who makes independent expenditures in an aggregate amount or value in excess
of $250 during a calendar year" to make certain disclosures about the person's donors and
political campaign activities).
183 See, e.g., supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting the different opinions of two
legal commentators on the constitutionality of restricting nonprofit groups' political activi-
ties).
184 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting that the tax-exempt status of chari-
ties and social welfare groups, as well as the tax deductibility of contributions to charities, are
subsidies).
185 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on the political
activities of charities).
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the political activities in which I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions may engage, 16 especially because an avenue remains open for such
groups to take part in political activity through PACs. 87 By simply ex-
panding the IRC's existing rules against political activity to encompass such
actions, the voter registration drives of Vote Now '96 and the "issue" ad-
vertisements of the Republic Education Fund can be prohibited unless a
FECA-regulated SSF is used.
A second, more innovative-and speculative' 8--approach to regulat-
ing much of the political activity that presently escapes FECA's require-
ments is to expand the definition of political campaign activity set forth in
Buckley v. Valeo.1 9 In Buckley, the Court ruled that only political speech
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate is subject to
FECA, because a broader application of the law would create ambiguous
limits as to what speech is regulated.1 90 The Court then listed examples of
express advocacy, such as urging voters to "support" or to "oppose" a po-
litical candidate, in a footnote.' 9'
Many campaign finance reformers, who are opposed to unregulated ad-
vertisements like the Republic Education Fund's that "any reasonable per-
son would view.., as promoting a specific candidate," 192 contend that the
Court's list of words and phrases is not an exhaustive definition of express
advocacy.193 In fact, legislative proposals recently have been introduced in
186 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1983) (not-
ing that by limiting the political activity of nonprofit groups, "Congress has merely refused to
pay for [such activities] out of public moneys"); 6 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL
CAMAIGN AcTivrrms, supra note 26, at 9546 (Minority Views) (Additional views of Sen.
Joseph I. Lieberman) (arguing that nonprofit group political advocacy may be restricted due to
the benefits nonprofit groups receive from their tax status).
187 See generally Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that it is constitutional to limit the political activities of charities due to the fact
that such groups can establish SSFs to engage in otherwise prohibited political speech).
188 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 108, at 184 ("[Campaign finance regulatory enthusiasts]
argue that [issue] ads are intended to influence federal elections, and... may be regulated
under the Buckley framework. In fact, we have been down this road before, and the advocates
of reulation are dramatically wrong.").
9 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
190 See id. at 44 (ruling that "in order to preserve the [FECA] against invalidation on
vagueness grounds, [the law] must be construed to apply only to expenditures for communi-
cations that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate").
191 See id. at 44 n.42 (listing examples of express advocacy); see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text (discussing Buckley's examples of express advocacy).
1 6 FiNAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN AcTiviTiEs, supra note 26, at
95349(Minority Views) (Additional views of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman).
19 See id. ("inhere is nothing in the Court's decision to suggest that... footnote [42 in
Buckley] defined the exclusive universe of candidate-focused speech ... ."); see also Tena
Jamison Lee, A Pro and Con Debate: How Much Campaign Finance Reform Do We Need?,
['Vol. 147:971
THE DARKER SIDE OF NONPROFITS
Congress that would expand the universe of regulated political campaign
speech to include advocacy that, in some specified way, supports or opposes
a clearly identified candidate even without using "express" terms.
194
Under such broader definitions of express advocacy, the political attack
advertisements of groups like the Republic Education Fund are automati-
cally subject to FECA, eliminating a primary objection to the PAC proposal
that nonprofit groups should not be forced to use FECA-regulated SSFs for
noncampaign (as currently defined) political activity. Opponents to these
attempts to broaden the definition of express advocacy, however, "counter
that the Court has defined the terms once and for all and it
is ... [unconstitutional] to expand on the [Buckley] decision."
195
Even if it is constitutional to require charities and social welfare groups
to engage in political activity only through PACs, it is a safe bet that non-
profit groups like Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education Fund will vo-
ciferously protest the PAC requirement. Implementing such a reform likely
will be similar to jabbing a stick in a hornet's nest, with angry charities and
social welfare groups storming the Sunday morning political talk shows,
proclaiming that their right to free speech has been filched. To borrow a
phrase from Shakespeare, however, "[t]he lady doth protest too much me-
thinks., 196 Is there really anything draconian about requiring nonprofit or-
ganizations to conduct their political activities through PACs, unless these
groups are purposely attempting to evade the IRC and FECA?
With nonprofit PACs in place, charities and social welfare groups may
engage in unlimited political and political campaign activity as long as the
federal election laws are satisfied. Vote Now '96 could openly advertise
itself as a vote-getter for the Democratic Party, while the Republic Educa-
tion Fund could sponsor "anti-liberal" advertisements until the television
networks run out of available commercial space. The nonpolitical endeav-
ors of charities and social welfare groups will not be impacted directly in
any way.
All political activities of nonprofit groups will be subject to FECA, but
this hardly works as a gag order on the political aspirations of charities and
HUM. RTs., Winter 1998, at 14, 15 ("IT]here is room for Congress to define with more clarity
what is meant by issue advocacy and political campaigning without running afoul of the
Court's real intent.")
194 See, e.g., S. 25, 105th Cong. § 406(b) (1997) (defining express advocacy as a com-
munication "that refers to a clearly identified candidate, that a reasonable person would under-
stand as advocating the election or defeat of the candidate, and that is made within 30 days
before the date of a primary election.., or 60 days before a general election"); H.R. 493,
105th Cong. § 251(b) (1997) (same).
195 Lee, supra note 193, at 15.
196 WILLIAM SHAKESPEAR., HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, line 229 (John Dover Wilson ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1980) (circa 1600).
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social welfare groups. Disclosure requirements, although a headache to
those wishing to keep their political activities a secret, are generally thought
of as critical to "deter[ring] actual corruption and avoid[ing] the appearance
of corruption by exposing... [political activity] to the light of publicity."
197
Nonprofit organizations that come to the political soiree should have to re-
veal with whom they are dancing.198 Prohibiting nonprofit groups and oth-
ers from using foreign money for political purposes is similarly a less than
earth-shattering reform; if anything, such a provision is probably what Con-
gress has intended all along.
199
The primary pitfall for the nonprofit PAC proposal is the contribution
limit that applies to federal PACs. Although nonprofit PACs, like all fed-
eral PACs, only face spending limits when engaged in political campaign
activity, FECA does restrict how much a contributor may give to a PAC-
regardless of how the money is ultimately used. Contributions by
individuals to PACs are capped at $5,000 per election,200 a far cry from the
nearly half-million dollar donation Vote Now '96 received from just one
foreign supporter.
20 1
Imposing contribution limits on nonprofit PACs engaged in political,
but not political campaign, activity is severe. After all, in these cases the
PAC subsidiaries would not be taking part in activities that are normally
subject to FECA requirements. For this reason, a concession is in order:
The size of contributions to nonprofit PACs should only be restricted when
197 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
198 See, e.g., MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 94, at 206 ("We propose that any person,
party or foundation disclose the amount spent on any activity that could influence the outcome
of a federal election, including nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns.").
199 See 4 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, supra note
26, at 4579 (Minority Views). "The federal law barring foreign contributions in U.S. elections
is set forth in section 441e of [FECA]. Section 441e is intended to prohibit foreign money
from playing any role in U.S. elections, but the statutory language is not as clear or as strong
as needed and should be strengthened." Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 4580 (noting that
"[c]lear legal prohibitions on [the ability of] foreign nationals" to contribute soft money for
"issue ads" are "vital to keeping foreign money from influencing U.S. elections"); see also 3
id. at 4471 ("[The] prohibition [against foreign nationals directly or indirectly contributing to
U.S. elections] dates from 1966 legislation responding to congressional hearing revelations
that Philippine sugar producers and agents of Nicaraguan president Luis Somoza contributed
to federal candidates."); Stuart W. Nolan, Jr., Comment, Campaign Finance Reform: Apply-
ing the First Amendment in a Marketplace of Ideas, 6 COMMLAw CONSPEcTUs 113, 119
(1998) ("FBI investigators [examining alleged campaign fundraising abuses in the 1996 elec-
tions] uncovered illegal foreign contributions of so-called 'soft money' to the [DNC]. This
prompted the introduction of three additional bills from Congress proposing to make such
contributions expressly illegal." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
200 See text accompanying supra note 132.
201 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing Chagoury's $460,000 contribu-
tion to Vote Now '96).
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the funds are used for political campaign purposes.2 °2 Although this is a
significant adjustment, it is fair to the nonprofit groups and may be neces-
sary for the PAC requirement to survive a constitutional challenge.
It is important to note here that a stalemate on the issue of regulating the
political activities of nonprofit organizations is the practical equivalent of
throwing our nation's election laws out the window.203 Without succumb-
ing to the "Chicken Little Syndrome" (that is, arguing for reforms by fran-
tically claiming that the "sky is falling"), it seems incredible that we now
live under a system where, hypothetically, communist foreign nationals can
legally make millions of dollars in anonymous contributions to a nonprofit
group that targets American citizens with the goal of persuading them to
support specific candidates for federal office.20 4  Or, perhaps more com-
monly, is it not a perversion of our political system when nonprofit groups
become key players in political campaigns, but are immune from FECA as
long as they make no direct financial contributions to the candidates and
avoid terms like "vote for" or "defeat"? The nonprofit PAC requirement is
an important step toward ensuring that political activities of nonprofit
groups are properly regulated.
CONCLUSION
In the 1996 federal elections, "there were really two campaigns con-
ducted"--"an 'overt' campaign and a 'covert' campaign." 20 5 In the overt
campaign, all participants abided by FECA.206 The rules of the covert cam-
paign, however, "were utterly different. ' 207 "In this parallel campaign, there
202 Regulating these contributions can be done as easily as requiring nonprofit PACs en-
gaged in political and political campaign activity to maintain two separate accounts: one for
unlimited contributions that may be used for nonpolitical campaign purposes, and another for
capped donations that may be used for either political or political campaign activities.
203 See, e.g., 5 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN AcTivITiEs, supra
note 26, at 7055 (Minority Views) ("It is possible ... that a single wealthy donor could influ-
ence the outcome of dozens of congressional races by channeling millions of dollars through
tax-exempt organizations. If large donors are allowed to operate on that scale-and with no
disclosure and no accountability-the campaign finance laws will be meaningless.").
204 Does this sound preposterous? It is not. Suppose that a social welfare group called
the "Communist Social Welfare Fund" is established. The Communist Social Welfare Fund,
like the Republic Education Fund, would be free to accept unlimited and anonymous contri-
butions from foreign sources. Those funds could then be used to conduct communist-oriented
propaganda campaigns and voter registration drives in targeted distrits.
4 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN AcTIviTEs, supra note 26, at
5983 (Minority Views).
206 See id. ("In the 'overt' campaign, all contributors ... revealed their names, their oc-
cupations, and the size of their donations to the [FEC].").
207 Id.
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was no disclosure, and there were no limits on how much money could be
contributed. Tax-exempt 'issue advocacy' groups and other conduits were
systematically used to circumvent the [FECA]," "severely undermin[ing]
our campaign finance laws and corrupt[ing] the electoral process." 208 This
is the political underworld in which groups like Vote Now '96 and the Re-
public Education Fund thrived, and "[t]here is every reason to believe that
these de facto campaign[s] ... determined the outcome of some... close
[federal] races."
209
Far from being an aberration of the 1996 elections, an "influx of new
[nonprofit] groups" are joining Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education
Fund in the political arena, sending "a clear signal that the aggressive role
taken by [nonprofit] organizations in the 1996 campaign[s] likely will be
repeated, or expanded," in future elections. 210 These charities and social
welfare groups, like those in 1996, will "spen[d] millions of dollars on ac-
tivities designed to affect the outcome of federal elections .... yet none
[will] disclose[] their contributions or expenditures to the public or ac-
knowledge[] that [FECA] applie[s] to their operations."211 Such secret po-
litical activity of nonprofit organizations is the Achilles' heel of federal
campaign finance laws and blatantly violates the purposes for which chari-
ties and social welfare groups were created.
This Comment proposes that nonprofit groups should be required to
conduct their political activities through PACs. The nonprofit PAC re-
quirement is a critical reform that will help plug loopholes in the IRC and
FECA that permit taxpayer-subsidized charities and social welfare groups to
engage in unregulated political activity. Confronted with this proposal,
groups like Vote Now '96 and the Republic Education Fund will no doubt
"defend their behavior by waving the First Amendment as if it were some
kind of Constitutional hall pass, where having the right to speak freely justi-
fies any and all behavior exercised under it, no matter whom it hurts. 212
Congress should not give in to these empty arguments. Nothing less than
the integrity of our democracy is at stake.
208 Id. at 5983-84 (Minority Views).
209 Id. at 5983.
210 Cummings, supra note 30.
211 4 FINAL SENATE REPORT ON 1996 ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVrIES, supra note 26, at
5926 (Minority Views).
6 id. at 9552 (Additional views of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman).
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